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FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4408
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SANAA 001814

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS TO S/CRS FOR BRENDA HAZZARD, CHIEF OF EARLY
WARNING.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2016
TAGS: [PINS](#) [PGOV](#) [PTER](#) [EAID](#) [PREL](#) [KDEM](#) [KCRS](#) [YM](#)
SUBJECT: EMBASSY SANAA COMMENTS ON NIC WATCHLIST

REF: SECSTATE 94560

Classified By: DCM Nabeel Khoury for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

11. (U) Post recommends the following changes to the suggested
test for Yemen in the NIC watchlist of internal instability:

12. (S) "Yemen's risk of significant internal instability over
the past six months has slightly decreased due to a
successful ceasefire with insurgents in the north, President
Saleh's improved health, and a public commitment by the ROYG
to combat corruption and implement reforms. Other
destabilizing factors, including a relatively weak central
government, a struggling economy, and strongly decentralizing
tribal influence on the populace, remain constant. Sanaa's
counterterrorism initiatives and alliance with the United
States counter destabilizing activity by unruly tribes and
Islamic extremists. Despite the arrests of several important
terrorism supporters, counterterrorism cooperation with
Washington has been inconsistent in some areas. The escape
of 23 al-Qa'ida operatives from a government prison in
February highlights corruption and gross negligence in
Yemen's intelligence security services. Saleh historically
has responded to internal pressure by releasing rehabilitated
extremists from custody and reportedly seeking truces with
extremist leaders.

13. (S) "Any number of shocks could trigger wide-scale unrest,
including further reductions in fuel subsidies, devaluation
of the local currency, or serious insurgent attacks in urban
centers. If Saleh dies suddenly or is incapacitated, there
is a good chance Yemen could fall into disarray, as any
successor will be severely challenged in holding together
political, military, regional, and tribal factions while
maintaining Yemen's fragile economy. There is significant
potential for violence in the 2006 elections if the
opposition chooses to oppose Saleh's candidacy, or if there
is widespread fraud at the local level. Any significant
challenge to Saleh's rule, whether from death, popular
revolt, or political opposition, would trigger a succession
crisis."
Krajeski